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I. INTRODUCTION

This study canvasses the interaction between terror threat announcements and
the civil liberties/collective security balance during the three years after September
11, 2001. Part II considers how security threat environments alter the parity
between collective security and civil liberties, but emphasizes that this shift is
typically not from real, verified peril, but from perception of risk.' Part I11
addresses notable post-9/11 threat warnings and the detention of terror suspects.2 It
inquires whether terror threat notifications were prudently issued and an imperative
mechanism to apprise the populace of realistic and verified risks. In most cases, it
is not clear that detainees' interrogations or interviews sourced the
announcements. 3 A repercussion from ardent portrayals of danger is that irrational
perceptions may skew informed public choice.4 Part IV examines alternative
global, diurnal dangers to objectify the threat of terrorism.5 Part V concludes the
work by summarizing these elements in a pithy game theory analysis.

M.A. Political Science (Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Michigan), LL.M. International Law
*
(Georgetown). The author has taught international law courses for Cooley Law School and the Department of
Political Science at the University of Michigan, American Government and Constitutional Law courses for Alma
College, and business law courses at Central Michigan University and the University of Miami.
I.
See infra Part ll.
See infra PartIll.
2.
3.
See generalyinfra Parts lil(B)-(C).
See infra note 26, at 26.
4.
See infra Part IV.
5.
6.
See infra Part V.
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II. BALANCING COLLECTWE SECURITY AND CivIL LIBERTIES

A. Theory
One reason governments were formed was to bestow a centralized authority to
quell anarchy among people in a state of nature, which is commonly named a
Lockean Bargain. Governments provided security and punished wrongdoers so
that members of society would abstain from engaging in self-help.8 Governments
prescribed rules that stationed sovereigns along a continuum of authoritarian to
democratic rule, and fashioned a collective security and individual rights stasis.9
Sovereign governments became the norm and threats emanated from hazardous
intentions and actions of other states. Following World War II, countries
constituted the United Nations to provide a rule-based collective security system
obliging members to respect sovereignty and reconcile dissention by diplomacy,
rather than by using force.o Nonetheless, the Cold War erupted and was marked by
associations of countries clenching menacing weapons and contrasting ideals about
property rights and governance." Domestically, hawkish officials consternated
over citizens possessing loyalties to a foreign government or precariously
unorthodox views, leading to breeds of seditious crackdown and diluted individual
liberties to avail collective security measures.12 The distance between real and
exaggerated perceptions of crisis has produced notable discord over the extent that
liberties should be sacrificed in a perceived security threat atmosphere.
Benjamin Franklin advised that "[t]hose who would give up essential Liberty,
to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety."" Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote that "civil liberty [does not] occupy as favored a position
in wartime as it does in peacetime," but those civil liberties are restored after the

7.
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 269-78 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1690); FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 481 (1994)

(noting that the protective principle extends to "ensuring domestic tranquility among a diverse and sometimes
bellicose people").
8.
LOCKE, supra note 7, at 274-75.
9.

ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE

COURTS 31 (2007) ("Constitutional rules do no good, and some harm, if they block government's attempts to
adjust the balance as threats wax and wane."); Christopher Kurtz, Torture, Necessity and Existential Politics, 95
CAL. L. REV. 235, 273 (2007) ("The nation is rendered insecure only when its identity and existence comes under
siege."); see generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE VITAL CENTER: THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM (1949);
HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, FREEDOM AND ORDER (1966); FRANCIS BIDDLE, THE FEAR OF FREEDOM (1951).

10.
U.N. Charter art. 2(4) ("All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
11.
Infra note 12.
12.
Robert Bejesky, From Marginalizing Economic Discourse with Security Threats to Approbating
Corporate Lobbies and Campaign Contributions, 12 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter
Bejesky, Economic Discourse](explaining crackdowns that occurred in the U.S.). Soviet republics also suppressed
crime and nonconformity, perhaps with a stronger emphasis on maintaining order than upholding individual
liberties. Randall Pecrenboom, Human Rights andRule of Law: What's the Relationship?, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 809,
902-03 (2005).
13.
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 242 (Leonard W. Labaree ed., Vol. 6,
1963).
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war is completed.14 Professor Ignatieff explained that "[r]ights may have to bow to
security in some instances . . . . .[and] rights cannot so limit the exercise of
authority as to make decisive action impossible."05 Addressing recent responses to
terrorism, former United Nations General-Secretary, Kofi Annan, expounded:
"Human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are essential tools in the
effort to combat terrorism-not privileges to be sacrificed at a time of tension."' 6
During periods in American history-including World War I, Red Scare I,
World War II, Red Scare II (McCarthyism), the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and
President Reagan's Central American guerilla wars' 7 -officials intensified
collective security via initiating aggressive domestic law enforcement procedures,
issuing propaganda to marginalize dissent, and impeding the free flow of
information.' 8 In hindsight, experts have reassessed the credibility of threat eras
and have leveled reproach.19
Professor Jay wrote: "From the perspective of more than a half century later,
much of this fervor seems opportunistic and at times paranoid." 20 Professor Wells
delineated: "Government officials perceiving a potential national security threat
have often engaged in widespread propaganda ... to spur public support" with "an
exaggerated characterization of the threat posed by certain individuals or groups." 21
Professors Lustgarten and Leigh explain that "official responses to emergencies
which were overwhelmingly viewed at the time as not merely justifiable but
compelling, have consistently turned out to be excessive, unnecessary, and often
shameful."22 Senator Gary Hart remarked: "Even during the cold war, those times
that we sacrificed civil liberties, I found out as a member of the Church Committee,
were almost always unnecessary to protect our country. Massive opening of
people's mail, massive wire tapping of phone calls-it always happens when

WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 224-25 (1998);
14.
Peerenboom, supra note 12, at 914; Vincent-Joel Proulx, If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run for your
Life: Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and TargetedKilling ofSuspected Terrorists, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 801,
832-33 (2005) (Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights permits detaining individuals without
normal protections in times of national emergency).
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS INAN AGE OF TERROR 9 (2004).
15.
Press Release, The Secretary General, All Must Work Together to Counter Terrorism, Prevent Spread
16.
of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Secretary-General Says, U.N. Doe. SG/SM/8624-SC/7680 (Mar. 6, 2003),
availableat http://www.un.orgfNews/Press/docs/2003/sgsm8624.doc.htm.
M. LEVIN, POLITICAL HISTORY INAMERICA: THE DEMOCRATIC CAPACITY FOR REPRESSION (1971);
17.
Lance A. Harke, The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 and American Freedoms: A CriticalReview, 43 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 667, 668-69 (1989) ("Efforts to focus the qualms and distrust of a society on a suitable scapegoat have
[included] . . . . Republicans during the late 1700's, immigrant groups throughout the 1800's, unions during the
late 1800's, socialists during the early 1900's, [and] Japanese-Americans during the 1940's.
); Bejesky,
Economic Discourse,supra note 12.
18.
Christina E. Wells, Information Control in Times of Crisis: The Tools of Repression, 30 OHIO N.U.L.
REV. 451, 464 (2004).
Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: From The Eighteenth
19.
Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 930-31 (2007).
Id.
20.
Wells, supra note 18.
21.
LAURENCE LUSTGARTEN & IAN LEIGH, IN FROM THE COLD: NATIONAL SECURITY AND
22.
PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 19 (1994).
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people become afraid." 23 Reflecting on judicial deference to executive crackdowns
during real or perceived crises in Britain, Professor Dyzenhaus opined: "[A]fter the
fact the majority judgments tend to be regarded as 'badges of shame,' and it is the
dissenting judgments that are seen as charting the correct course for the future. ,,24
In 1987, Justice Brennan stated: "After each perceived security crisis ended, the US
remorsefully realized that the abrogation of civil liberties was unnecessary. But it
has proven unable to prevent itself from repeating the error when the next crisis
came along." 25 A similar era followed after 9/11.26
B. Post-9/11 Institutions that Marginalized Dissent
After 9/11, new regulatory frameworks were adopted that emphasized
collective security, but institutions lamentably compromised more rigorous
protection of individual liberties. 2 7 The Patriot Act28 was enacted and extended the
Bush Administration's authority to wiretap, detain suspects, and deport noncitizens. 2 9 The Act morphed customarily understood definitions of terrorism by
applying policies underlying prosaic criminal law offenses. The Act defined
"domestic terrorism" as "acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State; [or] . . . appear to be intended . .

. to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion." 3 0 Connoting
that the stigma and harm inherent in terrorism is tantamount to a violation of
criminal law seems unnecessarily vague, while an unreasonable interpretation of
"intimidation or coercion" might endanger First Amendment rights of free speech
and protest. Author Abdus-Sattar Ghazali wrote:

23.
Sherman J. Bellwood, Lecture, National Security and the Constitution: A Dialogue with Senators Gary
Hart andAlan Simpson, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 7, 29 (2006); George Anastaplo, September 11th, a Citizen's Responses
(Continued), 4 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REv. 135, 147 (2006) (noting the suppression of "conspiracies" and
"subversion" during the Cold War).
24.
John Ip, The Supreme Court and House of Lords in the War on Terror: Inter Arma Silent Leges?, 19
MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (2010).
25.
Irene Zubaida Khan, The 2007-2008 Mitchell Lecture: The Rule of Law and the Politics of Fear:
Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 14 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1, 9 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring) ("In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a
reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some condition in between) is not well
entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government[.]").
26.

MARC SIEGEL, FALSE ALARM: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE EPIDEMIC OF FEAR 16 (2005).

27.
Jeffrey F. Addicott, Into the Star Chamber: Does the United States Engage in the Use of Torture or
Similar Illegal Practices in the War on Terror?, 92 KY. L.J. 849, 850 (2004) (preempting terrorism involves a
balance "between protecting civil liberties and providing adequate safety to the nation from the threat of
terrorism[.]"); Eric K. Yamamoto, White (House) Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the Courts to Hold the
President Accountable for National Security Abuses, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 318 (2005); see Terrorism
and Civil Liberties: Watch Your.Mouth, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 3, 2005), at 45-46; Europe and Terrorism: The
French Lesson, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 3, 2005), at 41-42 (referring to European balance between security and
liberties).
28.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), available at
http://intelligence.senate.gov/patriot.pdf.
29.

JAMES CARROLL, CRUSADE: CHRONICLES OF AN UNJUST WAR 47 (2004).

30.

18 U.S.C.

§ 2331

(2006).
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The so-called War on Terror has seriously compromised the First,
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of citizens and noncitizens alike. From the USA PATRIOT Act's over-broad
definition of domestic terrorism, to the FBI's new powers of
search and surveillance, to the indefinite detention of both citizens
and non-citizens without formal charges, the principles of free
speech, due process, and equal protection under the law have been
seriously undermined.31
Ostensibly, Americans irresolutely permitted civil liberty values to be
contravened, and accepted more intrusive law enforcement processes to remain
safe, 32 although the means to substantiate this espoused imperative need is
premised on secretive data.3 3 And, equivalent to the aforementioned security threat
eras, 34 citizens may not have held a rational understanding of the costs of
sacrificing liberties and the benefits achieved at the time deeper security measures
were imposed. According to the American Civil Liberties Union, the Justice
Department spurred confusion by presenting inaccurate statements about the
Patriot Act in the media. Simplistic conceptions prevailed amid erupting
controversy.
The title "Patriot Act" served as a heuristic device to further conformity and
marginalize dissent as unpatriotic, even though an August 2005 Associated Press
poll revealed that only forty-two percent of Americans were able to identify the
purpose of the Patriot Act.37 Despite that the balance between civil liberties and
Abdus-Sattar Ghazali, 2001-2011: A Decade of Civil Liberties' Erosion in America-Part One,
31.
OPEDNEWS.COM (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.opednews.com/articles/2001-2011-A-decade-of-civ-by-AbdusSattar-Ghaza- I110824-629.html.
(Oct. 30, 2003),
ECONOMIST
Koh, Rights to Remember, THE
Harold
Hongju
32.
http://www.economist.com/node/2173160 ("Bush [Aidministration officials have now reprioritized 'freedom from
fear' as the number-one freedom we need to preserve. Freedom from fear has become the obsessive watchword of
America's human-rights policy.").
33.
There were frequent assertions that the "war on terrorism" was an effective protective measure, which
espouses that a higher utilitarian purpose was being achieved. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
claimed that there is "clear evidence that we are prevailing in the fight" against terrorism. R. Jeffirey Smith, State
Dept. Concedes Errors in Terror Data, WASH. POST (June 10, 2004), at A17, available at
counterterrorism
Cofer
Black,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A29664-2004Jun9.htmi.
coordinator for the State Department, stated in January 2004 that seventy percent of al Qaeda had been
neutralized-"They are being hunted down . . . their days are numbered." PETER LANCE, COVER UP: WHAT THE
GOVERNMENT IS STILL HIDING ABOUT THE WAR ON TERROR 162 (2004).

34.
See supra notes 17-26.
35.
Press Release, ACLU Says Justice Dept's PATRIOT Act Website Creates New Myths About
ControversialLaw, ACLU (Aug. 26, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-says-justice-depts-patriotact-website-creates-new-myths-about-controversial-.
36.

CARROLL, supra note 29, at 7, 48; Robert Greenwald, UNCONSTITUTIONAL: THE WAR ON OUR CIVIL

LIBERTIES (DVD 2004) (Interview with Georgetown Law Professor David Cole) ("[T]he real purpose behind [the
name 'Patriot Act'] of course, was to suggest that anyone who would criticize it is unpatriotic, is a traitor[.]");
Peerenboom, supra note 12, at 814 (calling the title the "so-called Patriot Act").
37.
Poll: Patriot Act Support Shrinks as More Learn Intent, ASSOC. PRESS (Aug. 30, 2005),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-08-30-patriot-act x.htm; JEREMY BRECHER, JILL CUTLER,
BRENDAN SMITH, EDS., IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY:

AMERICAN WAR CRIMES IN IRAQ AND BEYOND 250

(2005). Through 2005, 372 local governments passed resolutions refusing to enforce provisions of the Patriot Act
under the Tenth Amendment, and demanded that Congress make the Act consistent with the Constitution. Id.
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security was exploitable,38 officials insisted on being granted sweeping powers and
being trusted not to abuse those powers.39 Controversy erupted over the Bush
Administration's use of wiretaps, 40 government attainment of private phone
records,4' arrests that did not provide adequate Constitutional protections,42 and
other policies that chilled dissent4 3 and free speech rights."
III. THREAT WARNINGS
A. Secrecy
It is toilsome to evaluate whether Bush Administration initiatives to preempt
threats were unnecessarily excessive because purported national security crises

38.

DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON

TERRORISM 228 (2003) ("In the midst of security crises, government officials often see rights protections as little
more than obstacles to getting the job done.").
39.
Id. Attorney General Ashcroft remarked before Congress: "[T]o those who scare peace-loving people
with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists . . . ." Ashcroft: Critics of New
Terror Measures
Undermine Effort, CNN
(Dec.
6,
2001),
http://articles.cnn.com/2001-1206/us/inv.ashcroft.hearinglmilitary-tribunals-terrorism-probe-attomey-general-john-ashcroft? s=PM:US; ERIC
LICHTBLAU, BUSH'S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 270 (2008) (calling Asheroft's criticism

"McCarthyesque"); Jay A. Yagoda, Seeing is Believing: The Detainee Abuse Photos and "Open" Government's
Enduring Resistance to Their Release Duringan Age of Terror, 21 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 287 (2010)
("[A]fter September 1Ith, the Bush [A]dministration became profoundly committed to secrecy and unremitting
denials of wrongdoing.").
40.
Office of Senator Jay Rockefeller, Vice Chairman Rockefeller Reacts to Reports of NSA Intercept
Program in United States, GLOBALSECURITY (Dec. 19, 2005), http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/
library/news/2005/intell-051219-rockefellerdl.htm; Bush Says He Signed NSA Wiretap Order, CNN (Dec. 18,
2005), http://edition.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/12/17/bush.nsa/. The Justice Department declared that Congress
lacked constitutional authority to prevent warrantless wiretaps as an intelligence gathering tactic in the war against
terrorism. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY

AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 3, 7 (Jan. 19, 2006).

41.
Verizon Faces Suit Over NSA, ASSOC. PRESS (May 13, 2006), http://www.usatoday.com/money/
industries/telecom/2006-05-13-verizon-records x.htm; NSA Has Massive Database of Americans' Phone Calls,
USA TODAY (May I, 2006), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsax.htm.
42.

WALDEN BELLO, DILEMMAS OF DOMINATION: THE UNMAKING OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 206 (2005);

Elaine Scarry, Resolving to Resist, BOSTON REV. (Feb./Mar. 2004), http://bostonreview.net/BR29.1/scarry.php;
Jack M. Balkin, A DreadfulAct II, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2003), http://articles.latimes.con/2003/feb/l3/opinion/oebalkin 13; See infra Part Il(C).
43.
New measures were criticized, but it also helps to understand initiatives that were proposed but
dismissed. The Bush Administration insisted on being given discretion in the "war on terrorism." CHALMERS
JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MILITARISM, SECRECY, AND THE END OF THE REPUBLIC 292-93 (2004);

William
Safire,
You
Are
a Suspect,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
14,
2002),
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/ 11/14/opinionlyou-are-a-suspect.html (noting the Information Awareness Office's
massive data gathering activities on Americans and the TIPS Information Awareness Office to inform of
suspicious conduct). Another questionable proposal included the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007, which was brought before Congress by an amendment to the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (HR 1955), 110th Congress, (Oct. 24, 2007) (passed House, did not become law),
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=hll0-1955. This Act claimed the need to "prevent violent
radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence in the United States," and that these
concerns were a "threat to homeland security." Id. §899B(1)-(2). It proposed that a Commission be established to
assess ideologically unsound beliefs. Id. § 899(C).
44.

See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION

ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004); Eugene Volokh, DeterringSpeech: When is it "McCarthyism"?
When is it Proper?,93 CAL. L. REV. 1413 (2005).
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typically expand unreviewable executive secrecy prerogatives. 45 The President and
the appointed members of the National Security Council control the classification
and declassification of national security information, determine who is authorized
to possess classified materials, and signal the extent that those who possess security
clearances will be prosecuted for transgressions.46 The problem of secrecy became
so unfavorable during the Bush Administration that the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) initiated legal action against Vice President Cheney
in 2002, and proffered in its filing statement that this was "'the first time that the
GAO has filed suit against a federal official in connection with a records access
issue.... Nevertheless, given GAO's responsibility to Congress and the American
people, we have no other choice.",A7 The suit was dismissed and there was no
appeal.48 Courts traditionally grant the government discretion when security threats
are alleged and only minimally review the resulting executive action. 4 9 A 2004
Congressional study observed that there was "a consistent pattern in the [Bush]
Administration's actions: laws that are designed to promote public access to
information have been undermined, while laws that authorize the government to
withhold information or to operate in secret have been expanded." 50
The Patriot Act and other measures might not have been perceived as
necessary without cognitively available terror threat announcements that fostered
the expectation of a dire need to foil probable attacks.5 ' The White House issued
45.
Wells, supra note 18, at 452 ("[Perceived security crises lead to] increased classification of
information, . . . increased assertions of executive privilege, and increased secrecy with respect to government
operations generally.").
46.
Robert Bejesky, National Security Information Flow: From Source to Reporter's Privilege, 24(3) ST.
THOMAS L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 4-22) [hereinafter Bejesky, Flow].
Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Jane E. Kirtley, Transparency and
47.
Accountability in a Time of Terror: The Bush Administration'sAssault on Freedom of Information, II COMM. L.
& POL'Y 479, 485 (2006).

Kirtley, supra note 47, at 485-86 (stating the GAO lawsuit was followed by lawsuits by Judicial
48.
Watch, Inc. and the Sierra Club, which were also subsequently dismissed by the federal appellate court after the
U.S. Supreme Court remanded the issues back to the appellate court).
David C. Vladeck, Litigating National Security Cases in the Aftermath of 9/11, 2 J. NAT. SEC. L. &
49.
POL'Y 165, 191 (2006); Raquel Aldana-Pindell, The 9/11 "National Security" Cases: Three PrinciplesGuiding
Judges' Decision-Making, 81 OR. L. REV. 985, 995 (2002); Tania Cruz, Judicial Scrutiny of National Security:
Executive Restrictions on Civil Liberties When "Fearsand Prejudicesare Aroused," 2 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 129,
162 (2003).
50.
Minority Staff of the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong,
Secrecy in the Bush Administration(2004), at iii, available at: http:www.fas.org/sgp/library/waxman.pdf; Michael
Posner, Prison and Detention: Human Rights in the Post-September 11 Environment, 5 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST.
181, 184 (2006) (noting that Governor Thomas Kean, head of the 9/11 Commission, remarked "that three-quarters
of the classified documents that he read in preparation for the Commission's report should not have been
classified" and that "[a] National Archives audit found that one-third of the records re-classified by the CIA and
other agencies in 2005 were wrongly kept secret").
Former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter remarks: "The more we're afraid, the more you ask us to
51.
give-Patriot Act 11,enhancements to the Patriot Act-now the budgets starting to be bankrupted, billions flowing
out of this country ...

into a war on terror." HUACKING CATASTROPHE: 9/11 FEAR & SELLING AMERICAN EMPIRE

(Media Education Foundation 2006) (Interview with Ritter). Emeritus Professor Chalmers Johnson notes:
"Perpetual war, the loss of civil liberties, the lack of trust in government because they don't tell the truth. These
are outrageous and unpleasant political developments." Id. (Interview with Johnson). "It has been far from
becoming to have the remarkably costly silliness we have seen in the measures devoted to domestic security."
Anastaplo, supra note 23, at 149. In July 2007, the Bush Administration was offering security threats in the
national media, which then placed pressure on the Democrat-controlled Congress to expand eavesdropping
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orders to institute the terror warning system and the color-coded threat level
classification,52 and publicized terror threat warnings. The media customarily
portrayed the United States as a "nation under siege,"5 even though there is scant
evidence that terror alerts correlated with a genuine risk of strike.54 There have
been no terrorist attacks on United States soil since 9/11,5' and University of
Pennsylvania Political Science Professor Ian Lustick reminds us that there has been
no credible evidence of "sleeper cells," "attacks," or "preparation for an attack." 56
Warnings were often ambiguous, general announcements that caused confusion
over how to prepare. 57 A GAO study surveyed twenty-eight agencies and
concluded that the color-coded announcement system was obscure and confusing
for law enforcement officials, that they "did not receive specific threat information
and guidance," and that the warnings "hindered their ability . . . to determine and

implement protective measures."5 8 Attorney General John Ashcroft expressed to
Congress that it was critical for national security to maintain secrecy over classified
information, but he also wanted to increase public awareness of the threat.59 The
peril and the computed threat level derived from classified data.
Discussing the method in which government officials prevalently furnished
terror warnings to the media, former United Nations weapons inspector Scott Ritter
recounted: "We have an intelligence report that terrorists are about to strike,
'who?,' we don't know, 'where?,' we don't know, 'what?,' we don't know." 60
Denis Halliday, former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations,
authority. James Risen, Democrats Scrambling to Expand Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at A12;
Ellen Nakashima, APush to Rewrite Wiretap Law, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2007, at A04; Carl Hulse, House Leaves
Surveillance Law to Expire, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at Al 7 (Congress letting surveillance law expire).
52.
Homeland
Security
Presidential
Directive-3
(Mar.
11,
2002),
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/Iaws/ge 1214508631313.shtm#l. Frequent threat issuance may desensitize the public
and reduce effective responses to real threats, or even descend into rank paranoia. SIEGEL, supra note 26, at 98;
GAVIN DE BECKER, THE GIFT OF FEAR: SURVIVAL SIGNALS THAT PROTECT US FROM VIOLENCE (1997). "It is a

sad state of affairs when the public is constantly cowed, shocked and awed, manipulated to be afraid, then diverted
from remembering that nothing bad actually happened." SIEGEL, supra note 26, at 216. Judge Lipez explained that
.'the constant reminders in the popular media of security alerts color perceptions of the risks around us, including
the perception of judges."' James J. Knicely & John W. Whitehead, The Caging of Free Speech in America, 14
TEMP. POL. &CIV. RTS. L. REV. 455, 481 (2005) (citing: BI(a)ck Tea Soc'y et al. v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 19
(1st Cir. 2004)). On at least one occasion, Bush seemed bothered when threats were issued. President Holds Prime
Time News Conference, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 11, 2001), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2001/10/20011011-7.html ("Today, the Justice Department did issue a blanket alert. It was in recognition
of a general threat we received. This is not the first time the Justice Department have [sic] acted like this. I hope
it's the last.").
53.
CARROLL, supra note 29, at 96.
SIEGEL, supranote 26, at 16.
54.
55.
Brian Z. Tamanaha, Are We Safer from Terrorism? No, But We Can Be, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
419,419 (2010).
56.
Ian S. Lustick, Fractured Fairy Tale: The War on Terror and the Emperor's New Clothes, 16 MINN. J.
INT'L L. 335, 338 (2007).
57.
CARROLL, supra note 29, at 97.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HOMELAND SECURITY: COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS AND
58.
RISK COMMUNICATION PRINCIPLES CAN ASSIST IN REFINING THE ADVISORY SYSTEM 5 (2004),

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04682.pdf; Eric Lichtblau, Report Questions the Value of Color Coded Warnings,
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/13/politics/I 3alert.html.
59.
Letter from the Office of the Attorney General to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives (Oct. 15, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/letter-house.pdf.
60.
HIJACKING CATASTROPHE, supra note 51 (Interview with Ritter).
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remarked: "Mr. Bush has very cleverly manipulated the fear, the anxiety, and every
time he wants to jack up his ratings he simply stirs up the fear plot by upgrading
the impending danger without any specifics, of course. I think it's a very ugly game
that's being played on the Americans." 6' Congressman Jim McDermott, who is
also a psychiatrist, stated:
Fear does work. You can make people do anything if they're afraid
... You make [people] afraid by creating an aura of endless threat
. . . They played us like an organ. They raised the [threat level] up

to orange, then up to red, then they dropped it back to orange . .. It
was really very, very skillfully and ugly in what they did.62
B. Examples of Threat Announcements
In the case of security threat announcements, the ultimate source is apt to be
the United States Intelligence Community (IC) since it possesses national security
data.63 For many Americans, the IC, as the ultimate source, may increase the
credibility of a public announcement.M However, the IC's obligation to gather data
is separate from the authority to declassify intelligence. 6 5 Administration officials
control the national security apparatus and choose whether to release threat
announcements.66 Granted, some reports were excessively peculiar and taxing to
unveil from where they originated. For example, news releases postulated that
terrorists could use pen guns, hijack ferries, pack explosives into model airplanes
for missions, target cattle, or attack residents in small towns. 67 However, some of
the significant public announcements that ostensibly derived from classified data
follow.
On May 20, 2002, FBI Director Robert Mueller declared that "another terrorist
attack is inevitable." 68 "The next day, the Department of Homeland Security
issue[d] warnings of attacks against railroads nationwide and against New York
61.

BREAKING THE SILENCE: TRUTH AND LIES IN THE WAR ON TERROR (DVD 2003) (Interview with

Halliday). For a substantial list of books and journalist accounts to support this proposition, see also Yamamoto,
supra note 27, at 290, 300-01.
62.
Michael Moore, FAHRENHEIT 9/11 (DVD 2003) (Interview with McDermott) [hereinafter Moore,
FAHRENHEIT 9/11]. Ohio Representative Dennis Kucinich remarked emphasized that Congress "did not authorize a
permanent war economy" or suppression of dissent by the "Patriot Games, the Mind Games, [and] the War
Games."
John
Nichols,
Kucinich Rocks
the
Boat,
THE
NATION
(Mar.
7,
2002),
http://www.thenation.com/article/kucinich-rocks-boat.
63.
Bejesky, Flow, supranote 46, at 4-8.
64.

GARTH S. JOWETT & VICTORIA O'DONNELL, PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASION 280 (2006) (Source

credibility means that people generally respect authority figures, their knowledge, and expert opinions).
65.
Bejesky, Flow, supranote 46, at 1-9.
66.
Id at 4-22.
67.
Moore, FAHRENHEIT 9/11, supra note 62; Michael Moore, BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE (2002),
http://www.script-o-rama.com/movie scripts/b/bowling-for-columbine-script-transcript.html
(terror warnings,
apparently derived from surveillance "chatter" and was provided to residents of Tappahannoc, Virginia)
[hereinafter Moore, BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE].
68.
'Countdown with Keith Olbermann'for Friday,August 21, 2009, MSNBC (television broadcast Aug.
24
2009)
transcript
available
at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32539126/ns/msnbc-tvcountdown with keith olbermann/t/countdown-keith-olbermann-friday-august/.
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City landmarks . . . ."69 These and other early-warnings may have derived from the
April arrest of Abu Zubaydah, an alleged Osama bin Laden associate, in
Afghanistan.o Professor Scharf explained that "[t]he CIA was convinced that
Zubaydah knew of plans to conduct attacks against U.S. interests," and the Bush
Administration granted the CIA with authority to apply a series of more intense
interrogation methods, such as cramped confinement, stress positions, sleep
deprivation, and eighty-three sessions of water boarding (solely in August 2002).71
Zubaydah informed interrogators of al-Qaeda plans that were based upon scenes
from the movie Godzilla.72 Dr. John Prados, an official at the National Security
Archives, explained:
Zubaydah told interrogators stories based on what he thought
would alarm us ... [From Godzilla in which] the Brooklyn Bridge
was destroyed by the monster. He told us al Qaeda was interested
in destroying the Brooklyn Bridge. He told us of attacks on mass
transit sources like subway trains. He told us there were intentions
of attacking apartment buildings and shopping centers.73
It was unclear if terrorists and equipment were prepared to carry out
operations, if Zubaydah was conveying admiration for the targeting and destructive
capabilities of the monster in the movie, or if there was additional information that
enhanced credibility to the alleged plot. Nonetheless, based on Zubaydah's
interrogations, Attorney General John Ashcroft disclosed: "Recent intelligence
reports suggest that al Qaeda leaders have emphasized planning for attacks on
apartment buildings, hotels, or other soft or lightly secured targets in the United
States."74 To produce its report, the 9/11 Commission Report relied heavily on
statements made by the CIA's detainees, but Commissioners were never given
access to the detainees or tapes.7 ' Later, against the order of federal courts and
Congress, the CIA apparently destroyed interrogation tapes of Zubaydah and

69.
Id.
70.
The Power of Nightmares, Part 3: The Shadows in the Cave (BBC 2 television broadcast Nov. 3,
2004), transcript available at http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/videol040.htm [hereinafter Power of
Nightmares]; Tim Dickinson, Closing Guantanamo Bay, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 19, 2009), at 45 (Abu Zubaydah
was "alleged to be a senior Al Qaida operative" but he was not charged); Captured at Qaeda Leader 'Not Well,'
CNN
(Apr. 8, 2002), http://articles.cnn.com/2002-04-08/us/zubaydah.healthIabu-zubaydah-qaeda-allibi? s-PM:US.
71.
Michael P. Scharf, The TortureLawyers, 20 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 389, 399 (2010).
72.
Power offNightmares, supranote 70.
73.
Id
74.
Id. In April 2007, former CIA Director George Tenet was still discussing these terror warnings and
considering them realistic: "I've got reports of nuclear weapons in New York City, apartment buildings that are
going to be blown up . . ." 60 Minutes: At the Center of the Storm: Interview with George Tenet (CBS television
broadcast Apr. 29, 2007), http://cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=2739673n&tag--related;photovideo.
75.
Commissioners Kean and Hamilton remarked: "We also had no way of evaluating the credibility of
detainee information . . . . [Ilt was left to the reader to consider the credibility of the source ..... THOMAS KEAN
& LEE HAMILTON, WITHOUT PRECEDENT:

THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION

119, 124 (2006)

(Commissioners pressed CIA Director Tenet to have direct access to the detainees or tapes, but access was
denied).
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others, allegedly out of concern that its officers would be implicated in crimes of
torture.76
On June 20, 2002, Attorney General Ashcroft divulged, "[w]e have disrupted
an unfolding terrorist plot" with the arrest of Jose Padilla.77 On the evening news,
Dan Rather announced: "First, a CBS News exclusive about a captured Al Qaeda
leader who says his fellow terrorists have the know-how to build a very dangerous
weapon and get it to the United States."7 8 Jos6 Padilla is a United States citizen
who reportedly attended an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. 79 Padilla was
accused of plotting to detonate a dirty bomb and was held as an "enemy
combatant."80 He was detained for 1,307 days, often in solitary confinement, and
claimed he was drugged and tortured in custody.8 He was ultimately convicted on
general criminal charges and not dirty bomb charges. 82 Officials lost the
interrogation tapes. 8 As with Zubaydah, it is not clear if Padilla or associates
possessed such a capability or had taken substantial actions to execute a dirty bomb
operation.84 Padilla was arrested because Abu Zubaydha and Binyam Mohammed
provided information under torture.85
76.
Mark Mazzetti, CIA DestroydT 92 Interrogation Tapes, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/02/worldlamericas/02iht-03webintel.20539580.html; Mark Mazzetti & Scott
Shane, Bush Lawyers Discussed Fate of C.I.A.
Tapes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
19, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/19/washington/19intel.htm; CIA Destroyed Tapes Despite Court Orders,
MSNBC (Dec. 12, 2007), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22217926/ns/politics-white-house/t/cia-destroyed-tapesdespite-court-orders/; Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Was Urged to Keep Interrogation Videotapes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/08/washington/08intel.html.
77.
Countdown, supra note 68. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 699, 701 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd,
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). As Padilla got off the plane, he was arrested and Ashcroft held a
national news conference claiming law enforcement had just apprehended a terrorist who planned to set off a
"dirty bomb" in an American city. ALFRED W. MCCOY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE: CIA INTERROGATION, FROM
THE COLD WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR 170-71 (2006); PETER IRONS, WAR POWERS: HOW THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY HUACKED THE CONSTITUTION 255 (2005); JOHNSON, supra note 43, at 294; Elaine Cassel, The

Tragic Case ofJosd Padilla, COUNTERPUNCH (Mar. 8, 2007), http://www.counterpunch.org/2007/03/08/the-tragiccase-of-jose-padilla/.
78.
Power ofNightmares, supra note 70.
79.
Leila Nadya Sadat, Presumption of Guilt: The Unlawful Enemy Combatant and the U.S. War on
Terror, 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 539, 547 (2009).
80.
Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699, 701.
81.
Padilla became the high-profile American held in military prisons on U.S. soil, and his attorneys argued
that he had been "illegally tortured, threatened;" placed in sensory deprivation situations and stress positions;
deprived of sleep; and incarcerated in a solitary confinement space for 1,307 days, drugged with PCP or LSD, and
injections. Dan Eggen, More Setbacks for Case Against Terror Suspect / Legal Debate Flares Over Trying
Charges in a Criminal Court, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2006), http://articles.sfgate.com/2006-1119/news/17322010 ljose-padilla-criminal-case-gang-member/3; Warren Richey, Was Jos6 Padilla Tortured by
US Military?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Feb. 16, 2007), http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0216/pO2sOusju.html; Cassel, supra note 77.
82.
Sadat, supra note 79, at 547; Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power:
Interrogation, Detention, Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255, 1293 (2005); Kim Lane Scheppele, Hypothetical Torture in
the "War on Terrorism ", I J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 285, 324 (2005) ("Whether Jose Padilla really planned to
detonate a dirty bomb has been seriously challenged ... [The evidence was] his own statements and the statements
of others who apparently have been subjected to highly coercive interrogations.").
83.
Glenn Greenwald, What Happened to the Padilla Interrogation Videos?, SALON (Mar. 10, 2007),
http://www.salon.com/2007/03/10/padilla 10/print/; Curt Anderson, Tape of Padilla Interrogation is Missing,
USA TODAY (Mar. 9, 2007), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-03-09-padilla-tapesN.htm.
84.
Scheppele, supra note 82.
Sadat, supra note 79, at 547.
85.
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On February 7, 2003, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Tom
Ridge cited "credible threats" of an al-Qaeda strike and raised the terror alert level
to orange.8686 On February 10, Fire Administrator David Paulison advised
"Americans to stock up on plastic sheeting and duct tape to protect themselves
against radiological or biological attack."87 Less than one month later, domestic
and international dangers seemingly converged when Secretary Ridge forewarned
Americans to "buy duct tape" to seal their windows and doors in anticipation of a
war with Iraq.88 Two days after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Bush's approval rating
rose to seventy percent while the percentage of Americans who believed that the
United States would be the victim of another major terrorist attack sharply
increased.8 9 Dr. Marc Siegel, New York University Medical School Professor,
explained that it would be nearly unimaginable for clouds of dangerous gases to be
delivered successfully without being blown away by wind or destroyed by the heat
of the environment. 90 However, Siegel warned that suffocation risk from improper
equipment usage might pose a real health hazard.91
On December 21, 2003, Homeland Security again raised the threat level to
orange, apprising of plots to crash airliners into United States cities.92 On April 2,
2004, Homeland Security issued a warning that terrorists may attempt to blow up
buses with fertilizer bombs. On May 26, Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller
declared that al-Qaeda had a "specific intention to hit the United States hard" and
that ninety percent of the arrangements for the attack were complete. 94 On July 8,
'Secretary Ridge announced that "al Qaeda is moving forward with its plans to
carry out a large-scale attack in the United States. . . . during the summer or

autumn."95

86.
Countdown, supra note 68.
87.
Id.
88.
Philip Shenon, Ridge Warns Iraq War Could Raise Terror Threat, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/04/politics/04HOME.html; LANCE, supra note 33, at 251 (Department of
Homeland Security told all Americans "to go out and buy duct tape just before the invasion of Iraq, because of the
concern for the weapons of mass destruction that didn't exist.").
89.
Brian Cordyack, President Bush's Approval Ratings, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2005),
http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2005/04/25/GR2005042500945.html; Terrorism in the United
States, GALLUP (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/4909/Terrorism-United-States.aspx; Humphrey
Taylor, Successful War Lifts Many (Republican) Boats and Their Ratings Surge, HARRIS INTERACTIVE, at 1-3
(Apr. 18, 2003), http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/btw/citations.html (finding that Republicans generally saw a
surge in their approval ratings).
90.
SIEGEL, supra note 26, at 137-38; Scheppele, supra note 82, at 319-20 ("The chemical weapons that
one can realistically imagine al Qaeda being able to make would cause little damage; the successful delivery of
really harmful chemicals poses enormous scientific and logistical challenges.").
91.
SIEGEL, supranote 26, at 137-38. Store owners began to sell numerous chemical suits and gas masks
and there were people who duct-taped their houses. Walmart reported that gun sales surged 70% and ammunition
sales increased 140% after 9/11. Moore, BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE, supra note 67 (excerpting local news and
commentary). Companies sold steel "safe rooms" for their houses. Moore, FAHRENHEIT 9/11, supra note 62
(excerpting local news and commentary); SIEGEL, supra note 26, at 16 (noting the perception of risk made "people
afraid and ready to comply with the government's agenda").
92.
Countdown, supranote 68.
93.
Id.
Id
94.
95.
Id
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On July 12, 2004, the head of the Electoral Election Assistance Commission
announced that it might be necessary to cancel the presidential election if there is a
terror threat. 96 Former Director Ridge, who was responsible for raising and
lowering the color-coded threat alert levels, later stated that he resigned in
December 2004 because he believed George W. Bush "pressured him to raise the
'terror alert' level to sway the November 2004 US election." 97 A heightened
security atmosphere might strengthen political ratings. 9 8
On August 1, 2004, the Department of Homeland Security raised the alert
status for financial centers in New York, New Jersey, and Washington to orange.99
On October 6, based on federal warnings, New York City officials announced a
bomb threat to the city's subway systems. 00 Local news disclosed that it was given
the threat notification several days earlier, but federal authorities told them to "hold
off" on making the announcement. 0 ' Other media outlets later reported that the
source for the warning was an informant who simply "made it up."1 0 2
C. Interrogation, Detention, and Convictions of Suspects
As for terrorists who might carry out operations, such as those referred to in
threat announcements, administration officials provided projections of the
perceived threat shortly after 9/11. Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
explained: "This is a network that has penetrated into some 60 countries, including
very definitely our own and it has got to be rooted out ... Our intelligence priority
in many ways, is getting after the network here in the United States first."' 0 3
Shortly after 9/11, Attorney General Ashcroft presented wide-ranging estimates of
between one thousand and five thousand terror suspects inside the United States.10
The apparent assumption was that legal and illegal resident foreigners could have

96.
James Nieland, Note, Executive Suspension ofNational Elections: Sacrificing an American Dream to
Avoida Spanish Nightmare?, 15 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 389 (2005); Countdown, supra note 68.
97.
Oliver Knox, Politics Colored US 'Terror Alert': Former Bush Aid, AssoC. FREE PRESS (Aug. 20,
2009), available at http://google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALegM5hlW-dkUJZmLCnpf-AGQwNa0N-ptg;
Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar & Edwin Chen, Security Czar Ridge Resigns, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2004),
http://articles.1atimes.com/2004/dec/01/nation/na-ridgel.
98.
Professor Charles Lewis stated: "We have a perpetual war, which gives the incumbent sitting president
... a ten to fifteen point bounce on a public opinion. He is a war time president, even though we're not at war."
BREAKING THE SILENCE, supra note 61 (interview with Lewis). In February 2004, Al Gore stated, in a speech at
NYU, that fear was being used "as rhetoric to help politicians like Bush stay in office." SIEGEL, supra note 26, at
55; CARROLL, supra note 29, at 196 ("[The] war on terrorism is a cynical manipulation of fears for the sake of
power.").
99.
Countdown, supra note 68.
100.
Id.
Id
101.
102.
Id
103.

Power ofNightmares, supra note 70; THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF

2002), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf
AMERICA
5 (Sept.
("thousands of trained terrorists remained at large").
104.

ROBERT DREYFUSS, DEVIL'S GAME: HOW THE UNITED STATES HELPED UNLEASH FUNDAMENTALIST

ISLAM 13, 305 (2005).
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"sleeper cells." Law enforcement officials detained numerous suspects, but
confinement procedures were criticized.'io Professors Abram and Karmeley wrote:
The post-9/1 1 [arrest and detention] procedures violated virtually
every aspect essential to procedural due process: notice of charges,
the right to be informed of one's rights, access to a fair and
meaningful hearing, and a fair opportunity for review of charges
and grounds for detention. The blanket secrecy orders imposed by
the government masked widespread violations of core
constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments.' 06
Courts have held that "the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within
the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent."' 07 However, equal treatment for foreigners has proven
to be more troublesome in practice, at least under the Fourth Amendment, when
immigration control and/or security threats are elevated. 08 Secretive arrest
processes forbid detainees from contacting family members or lawyers.109
One year after 9/11, authorities detained and interrogated several thousand
people, primarily from Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian countries.110 However,
it is questionable whether investigations yielded valuable information.' or if
confinements were associated with terror warnings, such as those previously listed.
The Department of Justice acknowledged that there were no leads to terrorist

Id
105.
106.
Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/11
Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction Without a Difference?, 38
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609, 658 (2005).
107.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001).
108.
Akram & Karmely, supranote 106, at 664-67.
109.
IRONS, supra note 77, at 246.
110.
BELLO, supra note 42, at 207; IRONS, supra note 77, at 246. In January 2003, Bush announced in his
State of Union address that "3,000 suspected terrorists have been arrested in many countries, and many others have
met a different fate .. . [T]hey are no longer a problem for the United States." George W. Bush, State of the Union
Address of the President to the Joint
Session
of Congress,
BBC (Jan. 28, 2003),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2704365.stm. By June 2004, U.S. officials estimated that three thousand terror
suspects were being held in allied prisons. McCoY, supra note 77, at 117; Jason Burke, Secret World of US Jails,
GUARDIAN (June 12, 2004), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jun/13/usa.terrorism?INTCMP=SRCH;
Jeannine Bell, "Behind This Mortal Bone": The (In)Effectiveness of Torture, 83 IND. L.J. 339, 352 (2008) (noting
that in the U.S., "[m]ore than 5000 foreign nationals were detained between September 11, 2001, and the time the
photos at Abu Ghraib were publicized").
Ill.
Aya Gruber, Raising the Red Flag: The Continued Relevance of the Japanese Internment in the PostHamdi World, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 307, 312 (2006) ("[Clivil libertarians respond that the few citizen detentions,
combined with the massive detentions of noncitizens, represent as big, or nearly as big, a humanitarian crisis as the
large-scale detention of citizens."); James F. Smith, United States Immigration Law as We Know It: El
Clandestino, The American Gulag, Rounding Up the UsualSuspects, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 747, 801-02 (2005)
("With a lack of intelligence, and a lack of evidence that detainees were indeed associated with terrorism, came a
need for a secrecy to cover up the government's shotgun approach."); David Cole, The Priorityof Morality: The
Emergency Constitution's Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753, 1758 (2004) ("Putting innocent people who pose no
danger behind bars to reassure a panicked public is normatively unacceptable . . . .").
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activity after detaining nearly one thousand individuals"l 2 and conducting five
thousand interviews.' 13 Much of the information that led to confinements involved
hearsay and unverified tips.114 Of the first 765 detained inside the United States,
only six remained in custody and none had been charged with any terrorist act.1' 5
"In May 2004, the FBI launched another 'interview' campaign. . . . that . . .
sought to interview as many as 5000 individuals."" 6 Thirty months after 9/11, as
many as 5,000 individuals had been apprehended and held, at least temporarily, as
terror suspects.1 7 Prosecutors claimed to find evidence to charge several of those
detained and one was convicted.'18 Yet at the time, Bush remarked of
accomplishments: "We've thwarted terrorists in Buffalo and Seattle, Portland,
Detroit, North Carolina, and Tampa, Florida."ll 9 Professor Cole reflected on the
referenced achievements:
They say "terrorist sleeper cell." That's what . . . they call the

Lackawanna [Buffalo] people a terrorist sleeper cell, the Detroit
people a terrorist cell, the Portland people a terrorist cell. But when
you look at the details, the facts just don't support that, and they
have not proved that any group within the United States has
plotted to engage in any terrorist activity within the United States
in all of the cases they have brought since 9/11.120
In the Detroit case, four Arab men were arrested on suspicion of being an alQaeda sleeper cell.121 The prosecution claimed that the defendants' video taken at
Disneyland was replete with furtive messages to provide cell members with
locations to position bombs.122 It was later revealed that the government's sole
witness, a man named Youssef Hmimssa, had twelve aliases and was wanted for
fraud across the United States.123 Two of the four were convicted, but the verdicts
were overturned when Hmimssa conceded that he invented the allegations because
112.

Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow "War": FOIA, the Abuses of Anti-Terrorism,and the

Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1141, 1148 (2007); MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE,
AMERICA'S CHALLENGE: DOMESTIC SECURITY, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND NATIONAL UNITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11,at

7 (2003) (estimating 1,200). Given that these were foreigners in the U.S. being targeted, it should be noted that on
any given day thousands of individuals are detained by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement system.
Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts: An Essay in Honor of Henry Monaghan,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 656 (2010).
Akram & Karmely, supranote 106, at 629 (citing February 2002 statement).
113.
114.

Id. at 625.

115.

Dan Eggen, U.S. Holds 6 of 765 Detained in 9/11 Sweep, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2002, at A20.

Akram & Karmely, supranote 106, at 636.
116.
117.
COLE, supra note 38, at 25 (estimating 5,000).
Id; McCoY, supra note 77, at 194; OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE
118.
COMMISSION ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION 5-6 (2005).

Power ofNightmares, supranote 70.
119.
Id
120.
121.
Id; Richard Serrano & Greg Miller, How a Terrorism Case Came Undone, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2004),
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002062640_terrorl4.html.
122.
Power ofNightmares, supranote 70.
Id
123.
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prosecutors offered to reduce his fraud charges if he testified against the
defendants. 2 4 The defense attorney, William Swor, explained the government had
"reasonable questions and took them and made a complete fantasy out of them....
[T]his was totally driven by the need or the desire to have terrorists."l 25
Similarly, the Bush Administration hailed the Buffalo arrest as another
successfully foiled terror plot. 12 6 The evidence was an e-mail sent by Mr. al-Bakri
to his friends in Bahrain that expressed he would be getting married and would not
be seeing them for a while.127 The CIA interpreted this as a hidden message of a
plot to conduct a suicide mission. 12 8 However, al-Bakari was indeed getting
married. 12 9 In the case, six men pled guilty for traveling to an al-Qaeda camp in
Afghanistan, but there was no evidence that the men participated in or planned any
terrorist act. 30
In addition to eagerly speculating that wrongdoing was afoot, presumptions
about intent to engage in terrorism evidently merged with standard criminal justice
processes. For example, recall that the Patriot Act defined "domestic terrorism" as
"acts dangerous to human life that are violations of criminal laws." 3 1 In October
2002, Attorney General Ashcroft intermingled terrorism with non-terrorism
offenses when he addressed the National Conference of U.S. Attorneys and
explained that the strategy should be to "neutralize potential terrorist threats by
getting violators off the street by any lawful means possible, as quickly as possible
... [and to] detain individuals who pose a national security risk for any violations
of criminal or immigration laws." 32 In July of 2004, Attorney General Ashcroft
provided a twenty-nine page report to Congress that asserted the Patriot Act had
been extremely effective at fighting terrorism and was "al Qaeda's worst
124.
Id.; Serrano & Miller, supra note 121.
125.
Power offNightmares, supra note 70.
126.
Id.; Matthew Purdy, Aftereffects: Buffalo Case; Sixth Man Pleads Guilty to Al Qaeda Training, N.Y.
TIMES (May 20, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/20/nyregion/aftereffects-buffalo-case-sixth-man-pleadsguilty-to-al-qaeda-training.html?ref-mukhtaralbakri.
127.
Press Release, Mukhtar Al-Bakri Sentencedfor Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE (Dec. 3, 2003), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/December/03_crm_658.htm;
Power of
Nightmares, supra note 70.
128.
PowerofNightmares, supra note 70.
129.
Id.; Susan Candiotti, Prosecutors:No Bailfor Six Accused ofHelping al Qaeda, CNN (Sept. 19, 2002),
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/LAW/09/18/buffalo.terror.probe/.
130.
Laura Parker, Charges Often Reduced in High-profile Terrorism Cases, USA TODAY (July 18, 2007),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-07-18-terrorism-cases N.htm; Purdy, supra note 126.
131.
USA Patriot Act of200l, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 802(a)(5)(A), 115 Stat. 271, 376 (2001).
132.
COLE, supra note 38, at 22 (citing Department of Justice, Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft,
U.S. Attorneys Conference, New York City, Oct. 1, 2002); Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the
Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1116-20 (2008) (contending
that there are reciprocal influences between military and criminal detention models); John T. Parry, Terrorism and
the New CriminalProcess, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 766-67, 796-97 (2007) (remarking of a spillover of
terrorism processes into criminal justice processes); David Cole & Jules Lobel, Are We Safer?, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
18, 2007, at M4 (noting that the Justice Department claimed that there were 261 "terrorism and terrorism-related"
convictions, but only two cases "actually involve[ed] attempted terrorist activity"); The Association of the Bar of
the City of New York Committee on Federal Courts, The IndefiniteDetention of "Enemy Combatants": Balancing
Due Process and National Security in the Context of the War on Terror, THE RECORD 41, 110-11 (2004)
(explaining that similar approaches of interrogations of terror suspects might be used in criminal law, but this
poses numerous problems).
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nightmare."' 33 Yet, of the 310 arrests, which did involve 179 guilty pleas, almost
all of the cases were immigration overstay violations and domestic crime
violations.134
The ostensible leap in logic was that someone who committed a criminal act,
intended to commit a criminal act, or violated immigration laws, might also possess
a terrorist mens rea. Prior to 9/11, terrorism was treated as a criminal act and
defendants were prosecuted under criminal racketeering laws.'3 ' However, the
Bush Administration initiated confusion by reversing the inference and
conjecturing that criminal acts might be analogized to or be a harbinger to
terrorism. Perhaps following this supposition or something related was what led the
pool of suspects to expand uncontrollably. A presidential directive, issued in
September 2003, required government agencies to supply names and information
about people "known or appropriately suspected to be . . . engaged in conduct

constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism." 136 Despite
parameters, the "terrorism watch list"-that was derived from classified
information-grew to 325,000 names (2006), to 700,000 (2007), and to 900,000
(2008) and was considered "virtually useless." 37
D. Rationale for Announcements
Were the terror threat announcement system and the broadly-applied detention
and interrogation approaches reasonable? Was there a sagacious balance between
secrecy and openness? After all, the National Security Act (1947) was enacted to
maintain secrecy over information that Americans should not know about,' 38 but
133.
Shannon McCaffrey, Ashcroft praises uses of Patriot Act, The Seattle Times, July 14, 2004,
http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2001978867_patriotl4.html; President Bush Speaks at FBI Academy,
CNN (Sept. 10, 2003), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0309/10/se.03.html (citing false statistics:
"more than 260 suspected terrorists have been charged ... more than 140 have already been convicted."); see
generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT FROM THE FIELD: THE USA PATRIOT ACT AT WORK (2004), available

at http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/patriot report from the field07O4.pdf.
134.
IRONS, supra note 77, at 246. In October 2001, Ashcroft spoke to local levels of government:
Let the terrorists among us be warned ... If you overstay your visa-even by one day-we
will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you will be put in jail and kept in custody as long
as possible. We will use every available statute. We will seek every prosecutorial advantage.
We will use all our weapons within the law and under the Constitution to protect life and
enhance security for America.
Id. at 247; Cole & Lobel, supra note 132 (noting that as of June 2006, there were only two cases involving
attempted terrorist activity while the Justice Department claimed there were 261 convictions and guilty pleas of
"terrorism or terrorism related" offenses).
135.
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHAPTER FIVE: ATrORNEY GENERAL'S
GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIME, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS

(Sept. 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0509/chapter5.htm; George C. Harris, The Rule of
Law and the War on Terror: The ProfessionalResponsibilitiesof Executive Branch Lawyers in the Wake of 9/11,
I J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 409, 410 (2005) (noting that after 9/11, "the Administration decided to shift antiterrorism efforts from a criminal justice model to a war model").
136.
Walter Pincus & Dan Eggen, 325,000 Names on Terrorism List, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/14/AR2006021402125_pf.html.
27, 2008),
(Feb.
137.
Id.; U.S. Terror List Now Exceeds 900,000 Names, ACLU
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/us-terror-list-now-exceeds-900000-nanes.
National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 235, 61 Stat. 496 (July 26, 1947).
138.
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after 9/11 national security data was employed to issue an abundant number of
warnings and maneuver the color-coded terror threat level.'" 9 There were no attacks
on United States soil after 9/11 and all that remained was bewilderment over why
so many threats were announced.140
There was a further potential indication of the pattern in 2009. After a suspect
was arrested for allegedly planning to bomb a plane, former Vice President Cheney
and Republicans "mounted a communications campaign advocating that threats
exist that the current President does not properly acknowledge and address with
appropriate policies."'41 Professor Lobel remarked that the former Vice President's
position was that "if there is just a one percent chance of the unimaginable
happening, we have to treat that chance as a certainty." 42 This is likely true of
authorities being vigilant, and there is no discernible reason that demonstrates
President Obama's law enforcement policies do not take realistic threats seriously.
However, is Cheney's philosophy also implicit in an approach which favors
liberally-issuing terror warnings? Clearly, thwarting terrorism is not coterminous
with imbuing national discourse with peril to make threats cognitively available.143
More confounding is that publicizing severe danger, premised upon classified data
that ultimately did not substantiate crisis or urgency, followed by faulty American
perceptions regarding those threats,'" was the same sequence for all the unsound
pre-war intelligence allegations about Iraq.14 5
Alternatively, it might be logical to release warnings to the media if there is a
reasonable belief that Americans could be safer by exercising extra vigilance when
driving over bridges and going to shopping malls and stadiums. Maybe Americans
could detect a suspicious situation and thwart a terror plot. Or, hypothetically,
perhaps issuing a warning announces to a potential terrorist that a plot or cell was
discovered and prevents a strike from occurring. Yet, even if there is an underlying
rationale, it is not clear that notifications were substantiated. Relying on rumors,
such as those that led to the war in Iraq,146 or raw data and "chatter" from the

139.
See supra Part III (B).
140.
See supra Part Ill (A).
141.
Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Bush, Obama and Beyond: Observations on the Prospect of Fact Checking
Executive Department Threat Claims Before the Use of Force, 26 CONsT. COMMENT. 433, 471 (2010). NYU
Media Professor Mark Crispin Miller, author of The Bush Dyslexicon, remarks: "This is a gang that needs people
to be afraid. It's a gang that really can't have any political success whatsoever in a state of tranquility and peace of
mind." HUACKING CATASTROPHE, supra note 51 (interview with Miller).
142.
Jules Lobel, Preventative Detention and Preventative Warfare: U.S. National Security Policies Obama
Should Abandon, 3 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 341, 343 (2009).
143.
Cass Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 61-62 (2002)
When a cognitively available heuristic is available and "intense emotions are engaged, people tend to focus on the
adverse outcome, not on its likelihood." Id.
144.
Robert Bejesky, Press Clause Aspirations and the Iraq War, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 343, 348-56
(2012).
145.
Robert Bejesky, Intelligence Information and Judicial Evidentiary Standards, 44 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 811, 875-82 (2011).
146.
Id. The SSCI's investigation concluded from interviews of over a hundred analysts that "following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the trade craft of terrorism analysis shifted and analysts now feel obligated
to make more conclusive assessments regardless of the quality of the available intelligence." SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE
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NSA's Echelon surveillance, 147 may not be the foremost sources to buttress public
threat warnings. The portrayal may beget emotive public reactions and a failure to
objectively and rationally assess danger.
IV. A MORE SOBER RISK CALCULATION
A. Rhetoric Elevates Risk Perceptions
Professor Daniel Reisberg explains that "people regularly overestimate the
frequency of events that are, in actuality, quite rare."148 Since people exaggerate the
frequency of vivid and emotional risks, 149 they may not objectively or appropriately
calculate excessively-portrayed dangers. 5 o Risks are a matter of perspective--one
could view the world as inherently dangerous or inherently safe. Statistical
evidence confirms that the high standard of living in the industrialized world and
medical technology advances have gradually decreased health threats and made
people safer, but the post-9/11 fear of terrorism inflicted Americans like never
before."' Professor Michael Ignatieff encouraged a more sober perspective to
"distinguish moral condemnation from threat assessment" and divorce emotions of
ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ 31 (July 7, 2004). The Deputy Director at the CIA's CTC Office of Terrorism Analysis
explained that:
[W]e've encouraged and developed a sense of trade craft specifically on terrorism that says
push the envelope because the implications are so high and because we have to
acknowledge up front that ... we have to accept that often our information is going to be
fragmentary and, if we wait too long to reach conclusions, we might make a mistake.
Id. However, using a more aggressive investigatory lens inside the intelligence apparatus, does not assume that
those more cautious estimates must be announced in the national media. There is a distinction between Open
Source Intelligence and secretive intelligence. Jason D. Soderblom, Opening the Intelligence Window: Realist
Logic and the Invasion ofIraq, 9(2) PERCEPTION J. OF INT'L AFFAIRS 21 (June-August 2004). Open information is

just public information that in many cases may be no more accurate than information held secretively. Apparent
interrogations of witnesses are made a quasi-form of Open Source Intelligence, while the source remains secret.
JAMES BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS 407, 421 (2001); Andrew Bomford, Eschelon Spy Network
147.
Revealed, BBC (Nov. 3, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/503224.stm; see Moore, BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE,
supranote 67.
DANIEL REISBERG, COGNITION: EXPLORING THE SCIENCE OF THE MIND 380 (2d ed. 2001); David E.
148.
Adelman, Scientific Activism and Restraint: The Interplay of Statistics, Judgment, and Procedure in
Environmental Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497, 543 (2004) (noting that people are apt to make decisions
following a position of being "better safe than sorry").
People can be trained to be afraid of anything. PAUL EKMAN, EMOTIONS REVEALED: RECOGNIZING
149.
FACES AND FEELINGS TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATION AND EMOTIONAL LIFE (2003); John B. Watson & Rosalie
Rayner, Conditioned emotional reactions, 3 J. OF EXPER. PSY., 1-14 (1920), available at
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Watson/emotion.htm; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) ("Men feared
witches and bumt women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears."). People
have a great capacity to "imagine dangers," misperceive them, and overstate risks. SIEGEL, supranote 26, at 26.
Robert Bejesky, Cognitive Foreign Policy: Linking Al Qaeda and Iraq, 56 How. L. J. (forthcoming
150.
2012) [hereinafter Bejesky, CFP].
SIEGEL, supra note 26, at 15-16; BARRY GLASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR: WHY AMERICANS ARE
151.
AFRAID OF ALL THE WRONG THINGS (1999) (American culture misdirects people to focus on "dangers" that are
not real tangible threats); see generally RONALD INGLEHART, MODERNIZATION AND POSTMODERNIZATION:
CULTURAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN43 SOCIETIES (1997) (As economic modernization progressed
and societies became wealthier, public desire to accept the same risks, frequently inherent in living, actually
decreased).
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angst and anger from risks actually posed.15 2 Professor Molly Walker Wilson
wrote:
When events, connections, concepts, and risks are easily brought
to mind, they are said to be 'available.' . . . [E]vents or depictions

that are vivid or emotionally loaded, are particularly likely to
become cognitively available.

. ..

More than a year after the [9/11]

attack, public polls revealed that a significant percentage of
respondents judged terrorism to be the single most important
problem, and 'fluctuations [in Americans' concern about
terrorism] closely track[ed] the frequency of television news
stories concerning terrorism.' 153
For over three decades, studies have repeatedly confirmed that fear prompts
inhibition and makes people more dependent on authority.15 4 If government
officials dispense warnings and the national media broadcasts the latest urgency,
mass society may internalize the message and fixate on low-probability risk. 15 6
When public perceptions accentuate dread, imminent danger permits the president
to utilize war power under the Take Care Clause of the Constitution." 7
Dr. Saby Ghoshray asked, "How, then, can one determine this imminent
threat? Perhaps a better framework could be to identify the factors that are used in
the presidential manipulation of the perception of fear."158 That is an excellent
question and one that springs an additional query to mind. How frequently did
President Bush provide a major speech that did not incorporate 9/11, threats or
terrorism? After 9/11, Bush Administration rhetoric portrayed that the world had
one exigency.15 9 Bush announced on the evening of 9/11 that "our way of life, our
very freedom came under attack."1 6 0 He identified the mens rea: "America was
targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity
in the world."' 6 1 British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that the war on terror is
152.
IGNATIEFF, supranote 15, at 54.
Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the Supreme Court's
153.
Campaign FinanceJurisprudence,31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679, 698 (2010).
JOwETT & O'DoNNELL, supra note 64, at 182 85.
154.
155.
SIEGEL, supra note 26, at 17.
156.

Id. at 56; JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD 17 (2004).

Saby Ghoshray, False Consciousnessand PresidentialWar Power: Examining the Shadowy Bends of
157.
ConstitutionalCurvature,49 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 165, 185 (2009); U.S. CONST. art. 11,§ 3.
Saby Choshray, Illuminating the Shadows of Constitutional Space While Tracing the Contours of
158.
PresidentialWar Power, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 295, 326 (2008).
Lustick, supra note 56, at 335-36; Jeanne M. Woods & James M. Donovan, "Anticipatory Self159.
Defense" and Other Stories, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 487, 499 (2005); Bejesky, CFP, supra note 150; Sidney
http://www.guardian.co.uk/
2006),
(Mar.
23,
Apocalyptic President, GUARDIAN
Blumenthal,
commentisfree/2006/mar/23/comment.religionl.
160.
President George W. Bush, Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation (Sept. 11, 2001),
availableat http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html.
Id.; Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at
161.
("They hate our
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html
freedoms."); IGNATIEFF, supra note 15, at 54 (9/11 "did not endanger the social order of the United States or
threaten its democracy with collapse"); Peerenboom, supra note 12, at 813-14 ("The war on terrorism has been
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not "a clash between civilizations. It is a clash about civilization."l 62 Similarly, on
the day that President Bush proclaimed that the war in Iraq was over, he quoted a
source: "[I]n the words of one terrorist,
. . . September the 11th would be the
63
'beginning of the end of America."'
On September 14, 2001, Bush adopted Proclamation No. 7463, which declared
a "national emergency" because of "the continuing and immediate threat of further
attacks on the United States." 16 The order espoused a "continuing and immediate
threat," but there were no strikes, confirmed plots, or convincing sleeper cells
discovered after 9/11.165 Bush continued the state of emergency annually.16 6 The
emergency had the legal effect of augmenting executive discretion and power in
other political domains.1 67 Likewise, in 2002, the National Security Strategy (NSS)
compared the Cold War threat era with terrorism and construed that today "our
enemies see weapons of mass destruction [WMDs] as weapons of choice,"168 and
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld called the post-9/11 era potentially the most
dangerous in history.16 9 In contrast to the NSS's portrayal, no terror group has
attacked with WMDs through 2012.170 According to the prevailing Cold War
discourse, there were dangers from nuclear strikes as the Soviet Union and the
United States pointed nuclear missiles at each other, 17 1 and the supposed dangers of
domestic communism across the country led to McCarthyism's Un-American

Committees. 172
Assuredly, the events on 9/11 made 2001 an anomalistic year for the number of
Americans killed in acts of terrorism. By comparison, U.S. Department of State
data indicated that during 2003, terrorism killed between 300 and 400 people

characterized as a war on 'our' way of life-on democracy, human rights and rule of law-and ergo on
civilization itself."); Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense,
Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military
Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335, 1338 (2004) ("Post 9/11 Chicken Little visions of supposed
necessity for radical transformations of legal norms are actually out of focus and unacceptable.").
162.
Janet Stobart, BlairDefends Foreign Policy of Intervention, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2006, at A3.
163.
President George W. Bush, President Bush Announces Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended (May
1,2003).
164.
Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48, 199 (Sept. 14,2001).
165.
Id; See supra Part Ill(A).
166.
67 Fed. Reg. 58, 317 (Sept. 12, 2002) (effective until Sept. 14, 2003); 68 Fed. Reg. 53, 665 (Sept. 10,
2003) (effective until Sept. 14, 2004); 69 Fed. Reg. 55, 313 (Sept. 10, 2004) (effective until Sept. 14, 2005); 70
Fed. Reg. 54, 229 (Sept. 8, 2005) (effective until Sept. 14, 2006).
167.
For example, see 10 U.S.C. § 123(a) for the authority to "suspend the operation of any provision of
law" relating to military enlistment contracts during a time of declared national emergency.
168.
See Richard B. Doyle, The US. National Security Strategy: Policy, Process, Problems, 67 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 624, 627 (2007).
169.
Robert Bejesky, Politico-internationalLaw, 57 LOY. L. REV. 29, 42-43 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky,
Politico].
170.
Andrew O'Neil, Terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction: how serious is the threat?, 57 AUST. J.
INT'L AFF. 99, 101 (2003) (noting that "political paranoia ... has been fueled further by a prevailing view among
policy elites and much of the academic community that large-scale terrorist acts using WMD are only 'a matter of
time."').
171.
Bejesky, Politico, supranote 169, at 42-43.
172.
Bejesky, Economic Discourse, supra note 12.
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worldwide,' 7 3 "ranking it so far down the list of dangers to livelihood that it [was]
barely visible."l 74 Similarly, out of a population of 300 million, 350 Americans are
struck by lightning each year.17 5 Since only thirty-five Americans died from
terrorist operations in 2003,176 Deputy Secretary of State Armitage remarked that
the low number was "clear evidence that we are prevailing in the fight [against
terrorism]." 77
The next year the State Department modified the name of its reports and
stopped tabulating statistics.'7 8 The National Counterterrorism Center began to
provide a "Statistical Annex Supplement" that instituted a "broader statutory
definition of 'terrorism,"' which escalated the number of deaths caused by terrorist
acts. 7 9 The threat appeared more urgent, and thirty percent of global terrorist acts
occurred inside Iraq. 80 With these adjustments, one newspaper explained that the
number of "significant [global] terrorist attacks" in 2004 was 655, which tripled the
number from 2003.
From data compiled by the University of Maryland, there were relatively few
terrorist attacks in Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion, but after the invasion, the
number of acts progressively increased each year to nearly 1,200 in 2010.182
According to these accumulating numbers, Iraq became the country with the most
terrorist strikes over the 1970 to 2006 period at 7,511, with the highest death toll at
19,415.183 Currently, Iraq has nearly double the number of attacks as Columbia, the
second-ranked country.18 4 Of all the chaos, coups, and rebellions in the world over
the past four decades, Iraq tops the list, and almost all of the atrocities and deaths
followed the 2003 invasion.' 85 As for Iraqi sentiment regarding foreign occupation,

173.
CRS Report for Congress, The Department of State's Pattern of Global Terrorism Report: Trends,
State Sponsors, and Related Issues, at 8 (June 1, 2004), http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32417.pdf; Smith, supra
note 33, at Al7.
174.
Lawrence Martin, Patriot Game, Media Shame, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (July 29, 2004),
http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0729-04.htm.
175.
Dr. Mary Ann Cooper, Medical Aspects of Lightning, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.lightningsafety.noaa.gov/medical.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
176.
CRS Report, supranote 173, at 8 (noting 27 American deaths from terrorism in 2002 and 35 in 2003).
177.
Smith, supra note 33, at A17.
178.
See contents of the new reports for 2004-2010. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Country Reports on Terrorism,
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/index.htm (in each of the reports, statistics have been replaced by anecdotal
chronologies).
179.
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005: NCTC Statistical
Annex Supplement on Terrorism Deaths, Injuries, Kidnappings on Private U.S. (Apr. 28, 2006),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2006/c-rprt-terrorism2005-anx.htm.
180.
Id.
181.
Kevin J. Fandl, Recalibrating the War on Terror by EnhancingDevelopment Practicesin the Middle
East, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 299, 310 n.60 (2006) (citing Tom Regan, Global Terror Attacks Tripled in
2004, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 28, 2005).
182.
University of Maryland, Global Terrorism Database, http://www.start.umd.edulgtd/search/ (click
"advanced search" and use "Iraq" as the parameter to graph the chronological trend).
183.
Gary LaFree & Laura Dugan, Research on Terrorism and Countering Terrorism, 38 CRIME & JUST.
413, 450 (2009).
184.
Id.
185.
Id
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in periodic polls conducted over seven years from the invasion through 2009,
approximately eighty percent of Iraqis were opposed to the occupation.
Professor Addis remarked that the "rhetoric of the war on terror" was
undermining American government institutions and individual rights, and "leading
to what Jacques Derrida has referred to as an 'autoimmune disorder"'-a "social
crisis shapes the identity of the body politic just as a medical crisis shapes the
physical body."' 87 After all, the Bush Administration represented that the battle
or a fight that "could last several
was an "unending" war on terror,'
89
Evoking the concept of war as temporally uncertain expands
generations."'
presidential power.' 90 Even after the Bush Administration departed from office,
some asserted that there was still the "specter of a universal enemy,"' 9' that "the
number and geographic range of al-Qaeda-inspired attacks has been growing each
93
year,"'92 and that looser social movements may pose a serious terror threat.1
Another author wrote:
2009 was a perplexing year in the 'war on terrorism.' The gravest
terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland arose . . . from the impetuous

acts of a baseball cap-wearing pushcart vendor, a U.S. Army
psychiatrist, a former high school defensive lineman, a gang of
ne'er-do-well ex-cons, and the confused, frustrated scion of a
wealthy banking family.

. .

. Over nine years after September 11,

2001, the war on terrorism shows no sign of drawing to a close.194

Did an era of frequent threat announcements and excessive consternation over
terrorism during the Bush Administration influence societal perspectives? Prior to
9/11, would preemptive action in cases analogous to the aforementioned have been
regarded as actions to confront suspects posing potential dangers to themselves and
others, or as thwarting foreseeable criminal acts, instead of subjects in the war on
terrorism? If the highly-emotive word "terrorism" was dropped from public

186.

Bejesky, Politico,supra note 169, at 102-07.

187.

Adeno Addis, "Informal" Suspension ofNormal Processes: The "War on Terror" as an Autoimmunity

Crisis, 87 B.U. L. REV. 323, 324-35 (2007).
188.
Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 283 (2004); Alan Clarke,
Creating a Torture Culture, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 18 (2008) ("no geographical limitations and no
end in sight").
Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected
189.
Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1409 (2008).
190.
Mary L. Dudziak, Law, War, and the History of Time, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1669, 1669-70 (2010).
Darryl Li, A Universal Enemy?: "Foreign Fighters" and Legal Regimes of Exclusion and Exemption
191.
Under the "Global War on Terror",41 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 355, 356 (2010).
Tamanaha, supra note 55, at 422 (citing The Fort Hood Attack: A Preliminary Assessment: Hearing
192.
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 3-4 (2009) (statement of
Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Advisor, RAND Corporation)).
MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR NETWORKS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 31
193.
(2008).
Adam Klein, The End of Al Qaeda? Rethinking the Legal End of the War on Terror, I 10 COLUM. L.
194.
REV. 1865, 1865-66 (2010).
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discourse might perceptions change?19 5 At a law conference in 2008, Professor
Hirsh was anticipating that the post-9/1 1 "era of fear" could be expected to
conclude in a "grand transition anticipated for the end of 2008."l96 Was it that the
"threat" was objectively ending, or was it that overwrought portrayals would
finally cease from government discourse?
The latter interpretation can be explained by the chronology of unsubstantiated
threat announcements during the Bush era, and by the fact that shortly after
inauguration, President Obama scrapped the phrase "global war on terrorism" and
designated the conflict "overseas contingency operations."' 9 7 Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton remarked that "the administration has stopped using the phrase
["war on terror"] and I think that speaks for itself."' 9 8 The other characterizationthat the threat was tangibly diminishing-was mentioned recently by Secretary of
Defense Leon Panetta.199 Panetta stated that the United' States is "within reach of
strategically defeating al Qaeda." 200
My point is that there is such a copious inventory of varying and frequently
irreconcilable news releases upon which scholars and commentators can either
view with a glass half-empty or half-full, and risk-prone or risk-averse, and apply
to "terrorism" that law review articles will stretch a vast gorge of interpretation.
Diversity makes for fruitful dialogue. However, statistical data does suggest that
the phenomenon of terrorism and its risks should be placed into a sedate and
objective vista, and perhaps be considered alongside other hazards.
B. Greater Risks
People regularly accept far more life-threatening dangers than terrorism by
driving vehicles and smoking cigarettes. 20 1 Every year, approximately 43,000
people in the United States and over a million worldwide die in automobile
accidents.20 2 People dread harms that might kill in vivid and "awful ways, like
being eaten by a shark" even though the "risk of dying in less awful ways, like

195.
Of course, isolating the emotive impact of the word, and the depth that the media favors riveting stories
is entirely unrelated to supporting government functions that confront realistic threats from terrorism. Bejesky,
CFP, supra note 150.
196.
Susan F. Hirsch, Fear and Accountability at the End of an Era, 42 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 591, 593
(2008).
197.
Wilson & Al Kamen, 'Global War on Terror' Is Given New Name, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html.
198.
Sue Pleming, Obama Team Drops "War on Terror" Rhetoric, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52T7MH2009033 1.
199.
Mary Walsh, Panetta: U.S. "Within Reach" of Defeating al Qaeda, CBS NEWS (July 9, 2011),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20078130-503543.html.
200.
Id.
201.
Miranda Hitti, Car Crashes Kill 40,000 in U.S. Every Year, Fox NEWS (Feb. 3, 2005),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,146212,00.html; U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Health
Risks, http://www.epa.gov/radon/healthrisks.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (citing 160,000 cancer deaths per year
from smoking).
202.
Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners' Dilemma: Coordination,Game Theory and the Law 39,
(Chicago John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 437, Oct. 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1287846.
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heart disease-the leading killer in America," is immeasurably higher.2 03 On 9/11,
2,978 Americans died, but during 2001, heart disease killed 700,142; cancer
553,768; accidents 101,537; suicides 30,622; and murders 17,330.204 In the United
States each year, 36,000 die of influenza,205 63,000 of pneumonia, and 15,000 of
AIDS.206 The Institute of Medicine reported that as many as "98,000 Americans die
each year from preventable medical mistakes. . . . [M]edical care is the third

leading cause of death in the United States, accounting for 225,000 deaths
annually." 207
Globally, eleven million die each year from infectious diseases, including three
million from AIDs and one million from malaria. 2 08 Ten million children die of
preventable diseases each year, which means thirty thousand per day.209 By 2000,
over 4.3 million children globally had died of HIV/ADS. 21 o Irene Zubaida Khan,
Secretary General of Amnesty International, explained: "The 'War on Terror'
dominates the world agenda. The sexual terror that millions of girls and women
suffer in the bedroom, in the battlefield, in the streets and in workplaces, is
ignored." 2 11 In an address at Cornell University, former President Clinton stated:
Half the world is living on less than $2 a day. A billion people live
on less than a dollar a day. A billion people go to bed hungry every
night. A billion and a half people never get a single clean glass of
water in their lives.

. .

. One in four of all people who will perish

on Earth this year will die of AIDS, TB, malaria and infections
12
related to diarrhea." 2
Since the end of WWII, there have been approximately 250 conflicts resulting in an
estimated seventy to 170 million deaths.213
203.
DAVID ROPEIK & GEORGE GRAY, RISK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR DECIDING WHAT'S REALLY SAFE
AND WHAT'S DANGEROUS INTHE WORLD AROUND YOU 17 (2002).

204.
SIEGEL, supra note 26, at 196; Stephen P. Marks, Branding the "War on Terrorism": Is There a "New
Paradigm" of InternationalLaw?, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 71, 74 (2006) ("There is a low probability of
occurrence of acts of terrorism and the number of victims is likely to be limited, whereas there is a high probability
(even certainty) of large-scale loss of life from preventable diseases.").
205.

CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
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and Answers Regarding Estimated

Deathsfrom Influenza in the United States, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/disease/usflu-related-deaths.htm.
206.
SIEGEL, supranote 26, at 18, 155.
207.
Randolph I. Gordon & Brook Assefa, A Tale of Two Initiatives: Where PropagandaMeets Fact in the
Debate Over America's Health Care,4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 693, 693 (2006).
208.
Marks, supra note 204, at 73.
209.
Peerenboom, supranote 12, at 857.
Nina J. Crimm, Toward Facilitatinga Voice for Politically Marginalized Minorities and Enhancing
210.
PresidentialPublic Accountability and Transparency in Foreign Health Policymaking, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1053, 1058-59, 1064-66 (2006).
211.
Khan, supra note 25, at 3.
William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks as Delivered at Cornell University, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 4
212.
(2005).
213.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law ofArmed Conflict by
Non-State Actors, 98 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 711, 712 (2008); Peerenboom, supra note 12, at 812-13 ("With
one-fourth of the world's population living below the international poverty line of $581 a year per capita, 790
million people lacking adequate nourishment, one billion living without safe water to drink, two billion suffering
from inadequate sanitation and 880 million lacking access to basic healthcare.").
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After 9/11, consider humanitarian disasters that rose to attention and eventually
disappeared from headlines. Many natural disasters may have been caused by or
were aggravated by climate change.2 14 The United Nations recently declared a
famine in Somalia.215 Nearly 300,000 died from the 2004 tsunami that hit
Indonesia. 216 In January 2010, an earthquake in Haiti reportedly killed over
200,000.217 Following the earthquake and tsunami in Japan during March of 2011,
an estimated 10,000 were killed, financial costs were appraised at $180 billion, and
the nuclear meltdown from the nuclear plants was called the greatest Japanese
crisis since World War 11.218
Consider traditional conflict among states and government abuse of
populations. Professors Finnegan and Hackley wrote:
The history of the past one-hundred years includes world wars and
other catastrophic examples of violent conflict, in which
protagonists were armies battling to gain supremacy and dominate
their enemies. As a consequence of these wars, more than onehundred million people died and many more suffered, national
boundaries were redrawn, and governments rose and fell. 2 19
Approximately 116,000 Americans died in World War I and 500,000 in World
War 11.220 Tens of millions died by dictatorial regimes killing citizens in internal
state suppression, including genocide; 221 and many other wars, rebellions and civil
wars led to extraordinary death tolls.2 22
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2011).
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Amy C. Finnegan & Susan G. Hackley, Negotiationand NonviolentAction: Interactingin the World of
Conflict, 24 NEGOTIATION J. 7, 7, 9 (2008); Christopher C. Joyner, "The Responsibility to Protect":Humanitarian
Concern and the Lawfulness ofArmed Intervention, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 694 (2007) (estimating thirty-five
million killed in interstate conflict during the twentieth century).
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Joyner, supranote 219, at 694; Jon M. Van Dyke, PromotingAccountabilityfor Human Rights Abuses,
8 CHAP. L. REv. 153, 167-70, 173 (2005).
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Vietnam War: History: Introduction, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/asiapac/
05/vietnam war/html/introduction.stm (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (the Vietnam War led to four million deaths). In
Algeria, an estimated one hundred thousand died at the hand of the government and opposing military groups
during the 1990s. Karima Bennoune, Terror/Torture,26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (2008). Declassified national
security documents reported on U.S. officials supported many military regimes. Bejesky, Politico, supranote 169,
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Amnesty International called 9/11 a crime against humanity. 22 3 Undoubtedly, it
is important to recognize victims. The United Nations' Secretary General stated to
terror victims:
To all victims around the world, our words of sympathy can bring
only hollow comfort. They know that no one who is not so directly
affected can truly share their grief.

. .

. We must respect them....

We must do what we can to help them. We must resolve to do
everything in our power to spare other from meeting their fate.
Above all, we must not forget them.224
This is true, but it is also important to commensurately recognize other global
problems, such as poverty. Interestingly, when President Bush addressed poverty,
he frequently conjoined it with the issues of combating terrorism and fostering
- *open market initiatives. 225
For domestic social problems, Hurricane Katrina caused tens of billions of
dollars in damage, homicide has been relatively common in urban America, one in
every three children living in violent neighborhoods has had post-traumatic stress
disorder, and the probability that a African American would go to prison had a
greater likelihood than going to college or the military.226 Not far from Bush's
current abode, across the border in Mexico, in 2007 there were 3,000 kidnappings
for ransom, likely due to poverty, at a value of over $100 million; and four rival
cartels murdered 16,000 people from 2000 to 2008.227

Khan, supra note 25, at 4. Before the U.N., as Argentina noted "that it does not accept the argument
223.
that the acts of international terrorism constitute a human rights violations, since, by definition, only States are
capable
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human rights."
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weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks."); Jeffrey D. Sachs, Global Poverty and U.S. Foreign Policy,
CARNEGIE COUNCIL (Nov. 6, 2002), http://www.camegiecouncil.org/studio/transcripts/226.html (stating that the
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United States, a strong defense, a war on terrorism, and open market, which will ensure the economic benefit of
this process of integration all over the world"); see Bejesky, Currency Cooperation, supra note 222, at 99-104
(philosophy applied in Iraq); Editorial, America's Promises, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/28/opinion/28fril.html (noting that Bush's Millennium Challenge Account to
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V. CONCLUDING ANALYSIS
The following chart depicts whether government publicly accentuates potential
terror threats and whether a strike occurs.

GOVERNMENT
ACCENTUATES
THREATS
GOVERNMENT
IS RESTRAINED IN
ISSUING THREAT
WARNINGS

ATTACK

NO ATTACK

Q1
-1, -2

Q2
2, 1

Q3

Q4

-2,-1

1,2

The first value in each Quadrant is a government payoff and the second refers
to the populace utility. The variables operate on two premises. First, both
government and the populace experience positive utilities if no terror strike occurs.
Second, a heightened threat atmosphere is apt to increase a government's approval
rating 228 and make the populace more amenable to accepting heightened collective
security measures, even though measures could temporarily reduce civil
liberties. 229 The values are hypothetical but are consistent with these premises. The
rationale for particular values follows.
In Quadrant 1, government accentuates warnings and there is an attack. The
payoff to government is negative for failing to thwart a strike, while the populace
utility is the lowest because there was an attack, and the citizenry likely
experienced negative, fearful sentiment with media warnings. In Quadrant 2, the
populace has a positive payoff because there was no attack, while the government
payoff is the highest because extenuating warnings without a strike may make
government appear more active and successful in implementing security measures
that ostensibly prevented an attack. This perception-that government successfully
averted or thwarted an attempted strike when one does not occur-may be a false
perception, which is why the populace payoff should intrinsically be lower than if
citizens were operating under more accurate perceptions. This Quadrant seems to
typify a circumstance in which there is a barrage of periodic terror warnings that
did not result in verifiable plots or suspects being arrested.
In Quadrant 3, government did not accentuate threat warnings, but there was an
attack. Here, the government has the lowest utility because a strike occurred and no
warnings may have made the populace perceive that government was unprepared.
228.
See supra notes 61-62, 96; Bejesky, CFP, supra note 150; James Moore, We're Afraid of the Big Bad
Wolf JudicialReview and the Implication ofRace in Government DesignationofEnemy Combatants, 7 RUTGERS
RACE & L. REV. 185, 191 (2005) (the Bush Administration exploited fears of terrorism and lacking security to
institute unconstitutional measures).
See generally Part 11.
229.
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However, in comparison to Quadrant 1, the populace utility is not as low because it
was not subjected to the negative consequences of periodic threat warnings. In
Quadrant 4, government does not emphasize threat warnings and there is no terror
strike. The public obtains the highest payoff, and the payoff should be higher than
Quadrant 2 because the citizenry was not subjected to warnings or under a possible
false perception about the danger.
With these premises, values, and reasoning, it is expected that government will
choose to accentuate threats amid uncertainty since political payoffs will likely be
higher whether or not there is an attack. If there was an attack, the government
forecasted correctly and warned even though it was not prevented; and if there was
no attack, the government may conceive an aura that adequate security is being
provided (even if this belief is inaccurate). Moreover, from a utilitarian perspective,
government might be able to reduce the possibility of attack because it seems more
acceptable to the populace to permit intensified collective security measures,
detentions, interrogations, and other measures when security danger appears
higher. However, this may compromise individual rights, something that the
populace might not condone but for the perception of peril. It also forms an
immense pool of wrongly confined individuals as suspected terrorists, i.e. false
positives.
In the case at hand, the uncertainty is whether the threat was as dire as the Bush
Administration presented, which is largely unconfirmed even today as the full data
may bide in national security secrecy prerogatives. However, the lack of
prosecutions suggests that the threat was not so importunate. Likewise, it would
seem that there are comparatively more grievous dangers facing the world than
terrorism, but elevating jeopardy makes the threat cognitively available.
Additionally, with a heightened domestic threat level, citizens may be more prone
to accept the credibility of other alleged national security threats, such as from Iraq,
which did indeed encompass the same time period surveyed in this article.
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